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Introduction
A smooth and successful school-to-work transition is of utmost importance for long term labor market outcomes (Gregg, 2001) . It has been shown that parental background is of particular importance (e.g. Gregg, Macmillan, and Nasim, 2012; Corak and Heisz, 1999; Chadwick and Solon, 2002) and that especially socially disadvantaged children experience slow transitions into their rst job (Gregg and Machin, 2000; Machin and Manning, 1999) . This paper is the rst to examine the correlation of parental unemployment at time of children's labor market entry on the quality of the children's rst job.
Economic literature provides strong evidence for parental inuence on children. A concretion of several family characteristics reveals that parents strongly aect children's achievements and well-being (e.g. Dustmann, 2004; Couch and Dunn, 1997; Kind and Haisken-DeNew, 2012) . Especially the correlation between socio-economic characteristics of parents and children's academic eort is shown to be important (Davis-Kean, 2005) . Following Chevalier (2004) parental education has a strong impact on children's education and thereby an indirect eect on children's income. Furthermore, parental income strongly aects subsequent labor market income of children (e.g. Behrman and Taubman, 1990; Björklund and Jäntti, 1997; Österberg, 2000) , which is due to e.g. dierences in parents' investment in their children's human capital (Blau, 1999) . O'Neill and Sweetman (1998) show that the probability to become unemployed is twice as high for a son whose father was unemployed 20 years ago compared to a son whose father has no unemployment experience. Other studies have shown that the reason why parents become unemployed highly matters. To become unemployed because of plant closure triggers an exogenous shock to household income (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens, 2008; Bratberg, Nilsen, and Vaage, 2008) , which results in lower future labor market income of children.
In contrast to previous studies, this study analyzes the immediate link between parental unemployment at the time of children's labor market entry and children's rst wage. Doing this, it provides new insights into the consequences of parental unemployment. Following Marcenaro-Gutierrez and Vignoles (2010) , it is hypothesized that an adolescent with high education and sucient nancial support of parents is much more likely to take up an adequate rst job. Consequently children who enter the labor market when their parents are unemployed, are argued to receive lessnancial support because of lower household income. This is argued to fundamentally aect the incentives of those children when deciding on which job oer to accept.
While parental unemployment likely leads to a decrease in their children's reservation wages, it also impedes parent's opportunities to help their children as they lose access to their active labor market networks. Thus, the overall relationship between parental unemployment and their children's rst wages is unclear a priori and an empirical evaluation is needed.
Using data from German Socio-economic Panel Study (SOEP) for the years 1991 to 2012, children between 17 and 29 years of age who enter the labor market for the rst time are observed. The SOEP is the dataset of rst choice as it links information on the children to the information of both parents (who are respondents of the SOEP themselves). The use of self-answered questions from parents reduces the probability of measurement error and gives rich information on parental background. Furthermore, the SOEP allows controlling for the specic reason why the parent entered unemployment. Following previous studies (such as e.g. Kassenboehmer and
Haisken-DeNew, 2009) it is argued that examining the eect of parental unemployment due to company closure can be argued to be exogenous for the child. Thus, it may allow identifying a causal correlation between parental unemployment and job quality of their children's rst employment.
The results show a negative correlation between paternal unemployment (due to company closure) at the time of children's labor market entry and the quality of children's rst job. However, there exists no signicant correlation between maternal unemployment and children's rst wage. These ndings highlight the importance of father's labor market status for their adolescent children. Father's unemployment at the time when the children enter the labor market is associated with their children accepting lower wages than children of fathers who are in employment. Interestingly, these negative relation cannot be identied between paternal unemployment and other job quality measures such as the likelihood to work on a permanent contract or the likelihood to work full-time.
The negative correlation is likely due to children's dissatisfaction with household income, that consequently results in accepting a low paid job in order to compensate the lower household income due to paternal unemployment.
Data
Data from the German Socio-Economic Panel of the years 1991 through 2012 is used in the empirical analysis. 1 The SOEP is one of the longest running household panel surveys with very comprehensive information. It is designed as a longitudinal survey with sub-samples for several population groups and is a representative survey for the entire population of Germany (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp, 2007) . The survey data is useful for analyzing the behavior of individuals and households as well as for questions of economic and social science. The SOEP holds several features that make it especially attractive for the present analysis. First, the information about observed adolescents can be combined with information on their parents by personal identication numbers. Detailed information on parental employment status is directly reported by parents themselves and is therefore less likely to be subject of measure-1 The data used in this paper was extracted using the Add-On Package PanelWhiz for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See (Haisken-DeNew and Hahn, 2010) for details. The PanelWhiz generated DO le to retrieve the data used here is available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are the authors'. 6 ment error. Second, the longitudinal nature of data ensures a sucient amount of observations of adolescents who enter the labor market for the rst time and for whom information on the parents are available.
In the empirical analysis the quality of the children's rst job is analyzed. The take up of the rst job is identied by a question in the SOEP that asks for a change in employment status. Here, the answer possibility I have taken up employment for the rst time in life is treated as the indicator for the take-up of the rst job. Additional rst labor market entries can be identied by using the information on Year of birth and Age at rst job from the SOEP biography questionnaire.
The quality of the rst job is measured in three dimensions -i.e. gross hourly wage, permanent contract and full-time position. As the rst quality indicator the logarithm of gross hourly wage, as a fundamental outcome variable in studies on German labor market (Gebel, 2009) , is examined as a measure of job quality. Here, the upper and lower 1% of the wage distribution are excluded from the analysis. The wage is self-reported by the children. Being employed with a permanent contract serves as the second job quality indicator in the analysis. Here it is argued, that being employed with a permanent contract reects a better job quality than a temporary contract. The third job quality indicator is being employed in a full-time position. Here, full-time positions are dened as jobs where young individuals work more than 37.5 hours a week. It is argued that full-time positions reect a higher job quality than part-time positions.
The variable of interest is the identier of unemployment of the parent. Thus, a dummy variable is included in the analysis that is equal to one if the parent reports to be unemployed or to receive unemployment benets in the considered year. Furthermore, additional control variables are included in the regressions that indicate whether the parent is out of the labor force. Here, the dummy variable is equal to one if the parent is permanent inactive or temporary inactive. Therefore, the parent being in employment serves as a reference group.
In the second step of the analysis it is explicitly controlled for the reason of parental unemployment. One might be concerned that parents either voluntarily enter unemployment or inherit unobservable characteristics to their children that make them and their children more likely to experience diculties in the labor market. Previous studies (e.g. Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009) have argued that examining entries into unemployment due to company closure, leads to the estimation of causal eects. Following their argumentation unemployment due to rm closure can be argued to be an exogenous event to the single worker. On the contrary, own resignation, dismissal, mutual agreements, the completion of a temporary job or apprenticeship, reaching the retirement age, suspension or closure of a self-owned business are treated as endogenous (thus voluntary) exits of employment into unemployment. Here, father's entry into unemployment due to company closure is argued to be exogenous to the child.
Individual characteristics like gender, age, marital status, migration background, living with parents and living in East Germany are included in the equation. Education is subdivided in low education (ISCED 0-2), medium education (ISCED 3-4) and high education (ISCED 5-7)
2 . The occupation groups (ISCO-coding) are aggregated at highest level from 0 to 9. 3 In order to account for macroeconomic conditions yearly regional unemployment rates 4 and year dummies are included in the analysis. In order to account for parental background, control variables for years of education of the parent are included. Finally, it is controlled for the size of the rm where the rst job is taken up. The variable rm size is split in three dummy variables:
Working in a small rm (0-20 employees), medium rm (20-200 employees) or large rm (>200 employees). The sample includes adolescents from 16 to 29 years who enter the labor market between 1991 and 2012. The observation begins at 16 years as the largest part of adolescents has nished the 9 or 10-years of compulsory education by that age. 5 While the survey begins at age of 17, information is also available for 16-years old individuals from personal biography questionnaires (Frick and Groh-Samberg, 2007) . The upper limit is 29 years by reason that only a few persons enter the labor market for the rst time after the age of 30 years. The sample period begins after German reunication due to strong changes on the labor market at that time. 6 The SOEP data includes 4,339 children for whom the wage in the rst job can be identied and for whom the number of hours worked is available. For 3,079 of them parental labor market status at the moment they start their rst job can be observed. After conditioning on the set of control variables, 2,382 children remain in the dataset. When the likelihood of working on a permanent contract is analyzed, the SOEP data includes 3,783 children for whom the information whether they work on a permanent or temporary contract is included. For 2,678 children, parental labor force status is known. After conditioning on the set of observables, 2,051 children remain in the dataset. Descriptive statistics are shown in table 1.
Empirical Strategy
The relation between parental unemployment at time of children's rst labor market entry and children's rst wage is estimated by ordinary least squares. Separate regressions are run for the dierent job quality indicators. Using wage as the job quality indicator, the logarithm of gross hourly wage is specied as the dependent variable. Applying the characteristics of being employed with a permanent contract and being employed in a full-time position, dummy variables are chosen as the de- pendent variables and linear probability models are estimated. In a rst step, the variable of interest is the parent's labor market status at the time of children's labor market entry. Here, the parent being in unemployment (irrespective of the reason for entry) is the variable of interest. Then in a second step, it is controlled for the reason for parental entry into unemployment. Here, the variable that controls for parental unemployment is split up into exogenous and endogenous unemployment.
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The estimation equation for the quality of the rst job is written as:
where Job Quality i reects one of the three job quality indicators for individual i, α the constant and SC i is a matrix including all control variables at time of labor market entry of adolescent i. The variables Both parents in UE 7 , Father in UE,
Mother in UE, Both parents OLF, Father OLF and Mother OLF cover all distinct stages of father's and mother's labor market status such that the reference group is both parents in employment. In the error term i , random and unobserved inuences which impact the dependent variable but not the independent variables are conjoint. By use of the White heteroskedastic consistent estimator the standard errors are corrected (Winship and Radbill, 1994) .
The characteristics of the rst job can only be observed for those adolescents where the entry into the rst job is observed. Therefore individuals are not included in the analysis, who do not nd a rst job during the sample period or who drop out of the dataset for all kinds of dierent reasons (e.g. stop answering the questionnaire or move to a dierent household and cannot be followed by the data providers). This leads to a selected sample and biased results if the selection into the sample is correlated with e.g parental labor market status. A Heckman-Selection model could control for the selection mechanism and thereby derive unbiased estimates. However, a Heckman-Selection model relies on a reliable exclusion restriction -i.e. a variable that aects the selection into the sample but not the quality of the rst job. Due to a lack of such a variable, the following estimation is based on ordinary least square estimations. Therefore, the results have to be interpreted separately for the subgroup of the population. Most likely, this subgroup is aected the strongest as they are likely to have strong ties to their parents.
Results
The results of the analysis are presented in two stages. In a rst step, the relation between parental unemployment at time of children's labor market entry (irrespective of the reason for parental unemployment) and quality of rst job is estimated.
In a second step, it is controlled for the specic reason why the parent entered unemployment. Here, the relationship between parental unemployment due to plant closure (argued to be exogenous) at time of children's labor market entry and the three job quality indicators are examined. Another labor market status is being out of the labor force (OLF). Again, column
(1) and (2) show that the father being out of the labor force is associated with a statistically signicant lower wage in the rst job of the child compared to a child whose father is in employment. Here, the point estimates suggest that paternal labor market inactivity indicates a 21% lower wage. Once more, the analysis of mother's labor market status does not show a statistically signicant correlation with the quality of the rst job of the child.
Summarizing, column (1) and (2) of table 2 suggest that the father being in employment during the school-to-work-transition is of great importance to the child. Both, unemployment and labor market inactivity are associated with 14-21% lower wages in the rst job of the children. This suggests that children of unemployed father are more likely to take up jobs of worse quality in terms of wages. When focusing on wage as the indicator for job quality, mother's labor market status appears to be irrelevant.
Specication (3) and (4) display the results for the likelihood of taking up a rst job with a permanent contract. Parental unemployment appears to have no statistically signicant correlation with the likelihood of taking up a rst job with a permanent contract. While both parents being out of the labor force tends to result in a higher likelihood of being employed with a permanent contract, only the mother being out of the labor force is associated with a lower probability of employment with a permanent contract. Furthermore, the father being out of the labor force, points to a lower share of children who take up jobs with permanent contracts. This shows that children suer in more than one quality measure and that father's labor market inactivity indicates a severe drop in their children's job quality.
Column (5) and (6) show the results of the empirical analysis for the third job quality indicator. Here, being employed with a full-time job (i.e. more than 37.5 hours per week) is the applied quality measure. None of the coecients of parental labor market status show to be statistically signicant from zero. Therefore, the negative wage correlation of paternal unemployment from column (1) and (2) are not compensated by higher likelihoods of entering full-time positions. Table 3 shows the empirical results for the dierentiation between exogenous and endogenous reasons for parental unemployment. Simultaneous (exogenous or endogenous) unemployment of both parents is a very rare case. As a consequence the variables of both parents being unemployed is deleted in the estimations of Table 3 . The same procedure counts for the variable that reects the status of both parents out of labor force.
When estimating the eect of unemployment due to company closure, a causal correlation is aimed to be identied, which corresponds to the study of Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) . Thus, in column (1) and (2) of table 3 the relation between parental unemployment and the entry-wage of their children is displayed, but no causal correlation can be measured. The previously found negative relationship of father's unemployment and children's entry wage is conrmed by the negative coecient, but it is statistically insignicant. The weak statistical properties are due to the low number of cases where the father is unemployed due to company closure. However, the sign and size of the point estimate is very much in line with the coecient reported in table 2 ( Table 2 (2) -0.137 ; Table 3 (2) exogenous: -0.155). Therefore it is concluded that father's unemployment at the time of children's labor market entry indicates lower gross hourly wages in their children's rst job. The non-signicant point estimate for maternal unemployment in table 2 results from opposing correlations of maternal exogenous and endogenous unemployment. While the mother in unemployment due to plant closure statistically insignicantly decreases rst wages, endogenous maternal unemployment increases rst wages. The point estimates of father or mother being out of labor force as well as all control variables are robust.
When the likelihood of working on a permanent contract is examined (column (3) and (4)) previous results are conrmed. Paternal unemployment reduces (but not statistically signicantly) the likelihood of working on a permanent contract. Interestingly, maternal endogenous unemployment increases the chances to work on a permanent contract. Thus, children of mothers who voluntarily enter unemployment (by e.g. own dismissal) earn more and are more likely to work on a permanent contract than children whose mothers are in employment.
No statistically signicant results can be found for the likelihood of working in a full-time job.
5 Conclusion
This study analyzes the relationship between parental unemployment at their children's labor market entry and the quality of their children's rst jobs. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1991-2012 three dimensions of job quality -i.e. wage, working on a permanent contract and working full-timeare examined. The analysis allows for dierent correlations of father's or mother's unemployment and labor market inactivity. By controlling for the reason for entry into unemployment, the analysis tries to identify the causal correlation of parents' unemployment during their children's school-to-work transition.
The results indicate that the labor market status of the mother appears to be less important than father's employment status. It is found that children of mothers who voluntarily enter unemployment appear to earn more and are more likely to work on a permanent contract, than children of employed mothers. Strong negative correlations can be found for paternal involuntary unemployment at the time of their children's labor market entry. Here, the results suggest that children's rst wage is about 14% lower if their father experiences unemployment compared to continuous employment of the father.
Socially disadvantaged children suer at labor market entry and following previous studies, this is likely to indicate long lasting negative consequences for future careers of the children. Thus, policy action at the very beginning of labor market careers is argued to be a promising tool to compensate children for father's unemployment and to avoid long lasting labor market consequences.
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A Appendix . * * * p<0.01; * * p<0.5; * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered on the state level in parentheses. UE = unemployment; OLF = out of labor force. . * * * p<0.01; * * p<0.5; * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered on the state level in parentheses. UE = unemployment; OLF = out of labor force.
